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Abstract 
Social sciences were built from comparison methods assembling field works and data, either 
quantitative or qualitative. Big Data offers new opportunities to extend this requirement to build 
commensurable data sets. The paper tells the story of the two previous quantification eras (census and 
polls) in order to demonstrate the need for a new agency to be considered as the target of this new 
generation of social sciences: that of objects as ANT proposed and of replications that propagate all 
over the digital networks. The case study of the topofil of Boa Vista is revisited to explore how a 
qualitative method dedicated to comparison and an ANT approach extended in a replication theory may 
offer new insights from any field study and may use the digital ressources to do so.  
It is widely acknowledged that our times of digital financial capitalism generate a general requirement 
for evaluation, mobilisation and traceability and that the digital platforms are a key feature of this new 
experience framework. Consequences extend from quantified-self to high frequency trading, from 
reputation scores to the new spring of artificial intelligence. We would like to emphasize two dimensions 
of this world of digital traces made available by the web and the platforms:  
- social sciences get affected as much as any other field and will have to revise a large part of 
their methods, provided that the analysis of the current changes does not miss the important 
point of traceability ; 
- if traces become the main resource, qualitative methods must be transformed as well as 
quantitative ones, since it is a whole new standpoint in research that is made operational, the 
one of replications, of propagation of cultural elements.   
We shall sum up the historical landmarks in quantification history that made emerge specific standpoints 
in social sciences. The first tow eras of quantification, cenuses and polls, manage to create a sense of 
                                                            
1 Many thanks to Jörg Potthast and to Susann Wagenknecht for their comments and careful reviewing.  
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reality for society and then for opinion, through carefuly designed statistical processes. The purposes 
were different, the stakeholders as well but it produced some reflexivity to social groups, to think 
themselves as societies or as opinions with comparisons made available throughout a nation state, a 
public or even at the international level. A third era is already taking its role to provide a new style of 
reflexivity. Big Data, Machine Learning and digital platforms make available a high frequency and 
finely grained feedback based on digital traces from very low level (e.g. clicks and cookies) to linguistic 
expressions (e.g. comments and posts). Social sciences have to move towards a smart use of these new 
sources, without quitting the previous ones, but designing the right understanding of what entities should 
be the focus of the investigation in this data deluge. We shall argue for a general theory of replications 
based on digital traces, which means reconsidering some old traditions that were forgotten, such as 
Tarde’s imitation theory, and reformulating the real contribution of Actor Network Theory observations 
to this new framework: objects, signs and circulating entities have an agency of their own and cannot 
be crushed under the powerful agencies of structures (societies as a whole) nor of individual preferences 
(opinions and decision of rational agents). We shall revisit a famous paper by Bruno Latour (1999), 
« the pedofil/topofil of Boa Vista », to show how new requirements for qualitative field studies can now 
become a standard, expecially within the actor-network analysis framework. This qualitative methods, 
focusing on traces, can then become more coherent with some quantitative ones, using massive digital 
traces, provided that their relevance is limited to some propagation processes, and that the general 
framework of replications make them comparable and even computable.  
Part 1. Making the social commensurable through 
quantification: historical landmarks 
 
When social sciences as much as society are enduring such a data deluge, labelling it as a “revolution” 
is less useful than trying to compare our times to other important historical lanmarks in the history of 
social sciences. Since we are confronted to the general extension of computation to all areas of social 
life, we need to understand first where these traditions of quantification come from, even though we will 
limit our investigation to the main changes in large social quantification processes that shape the way 
social sciences are. Of course, qualitative methods played a role in founding the basis of social sciences: 
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however, their connexion to large institutions that can reuse them for their own purposes was not so 
strong as it was for quantitative methods. To say the thruth, it worked the other way: states developing 
large census reused by social sciences, and media generating opinion polls that were exploited by 
academics for their own purposes. Sounds familiar, isn’t it? Social sciences and data scientists are 
craving for the huge amount of traces available on digital platforms that are not really eager to reveal 
what is their main source of revenue!  Deriving from this quantitative chronology, we will turn, in the 
next part, to the challenges of traces availability for qualitative approachs.   
 
1.1. How « society » got its agency  
If we want to understand the historical times that we are living in as regards quantification methods (and 
the social reflexivity that is attached to it), we need to look back to the times of the construction of this 
entity, ‘society’. Let us pretend here that Durkheim succeeded in making ‘Society’ exist. The term was 
not coined by Durkheim, obviously, although its history is not a long one. The archaeology of the 
concept of society (Latour, 2005) should be further enriched by calling upon the work of Quetelet, who 
produced the ‘average man’ which long remained the key to all statistics. At the end of the nineteenth 
century, however, and largely thanks to Durkheim’s genius, ‘society’ took a strong stance regarding 
‘community’, which was still prevalent (see Tönnies, 1887). Durkheim's early work on the ‘division of 
labour in society’ (1893) was not based on statistical methods, but instead laid the foundation for a 
model of social types, aggregated in mechanical and organic solidarity. Detailed examination of legal 
systems served as demonstrations and therefore relied on the groups formed or being formed that are 
legal systems in their traditional or more modern aspects. With ‘The Suicide’ (1897), the method was 
set up to extend the discussion of the types that would reveal anomie to be a problematic situation. But 
reliance on data records produced by states, from their various components (ministries, prefectures, 
governments) became key to the demonstration of society’s influence on individual behaviours. It was 
these aggregates that are explained or explanatory, using a method of comparison between countries, 
regions, counties or districts, where possible and necessary. The method depended entirely on the data 
available and could not afford to criticise or to question the procedures for the production of this data, 
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despite the countless limitations identified upon publication (Douglas, 1967). By organising his entire 
systems of proof around these national administrative statistics, Durkheim found a quantitative analogue 
for his conceptual choice that put ‘Society’ in a separate status from all manifestations and individual 
behaviours. Durkheim’s whole became an entity of the second level, ‘Society’, (Latour, 2005), while 
the censuses and other state-data-registers simply perform the task of recovering individual, 
administrative events (marital status, judicial procedures, etc.), formatted in identical categories and 
aggregated to reveal the behaviour of populations. Durkheim’s strength of conviction was to make these 
statistics exist as equivalent to his society: quantification is double-sided, it is able to account for a whole 
through the quality of exhaustiveness, and at the same time, itaccounts for the agency of the social 
structure as such, even though the two functions are not necessarily tied together (exhaustiveness may 
not generate an agency). 
It is necessary to note that a convention (Eymard-Duvernay and al., 2004) was formed between data 
producers from the state administrations and the emerging social sciences. Together they produced the 
entity societyas the object to be tracked by the state for the purpose of governing and to be explained for 
scientific reasons. The result is the widely shared and obvious fact that society exists, and the methods 
that allow it to do so have no grounds to be questioned because they demonstrate both their scientific 
and their operational value: they are ‘tools of proof’ and ‘tools of government’ as Desrosières (2014) 
put it.   
Other historical correlations are noteworthy, that do not mean causality but that do allow for an 
understanding of the power-gains this approach affords in making society exist. In 1890, Hollerith used 
a machine, a mecanographic calculator, that he had invented a few years earlier (and for which he filed 
a patent application in 1886) to conduct the U.S. census. The Census Bureau had not yet finished 
processing the previous census dating back to 1880 when it had had to start the next one. A change in 
technique was both necessary and available. Hollerith’s tabulating calculation-machine did the work 
and was sold for doing censuses in several countries. His company would later be transformed into IBM 
by Watson, in 1926. We can see how the power gained in the counting and description of populations 
reinforces the status of the State and offers it supposedly useful sources of information for its 
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governance. The pretence of the calculation’s exhaustiveness seemed to fulfil the promise of the concept 
of society: a technical device capable of inputting all that existed, that as Hollerith’s census-procedure-
equipping machine 
In modern Western countries, the State gained its legitimacy through electoral processes that rely on 
“nations”, those “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991) that work as a contenant ( a value, a 
concept) transmitted to the minds of the population while the State is the container (Boullier, 2010), in 
control of the bodies of the people, of their individual physical behaviour (borders, location) or as the 
‘materiality’ and the ‘statement’ that constitute the apparatus in Foucaldian terms (Foucault, 1982). This 
is why ‘society’ is always enacted in various ‘nations’ although social theory tries to extract it from the 
limitations of national boundaries. The first generation of social sciences was indeed doomed to 
methodological nationalism (Beck, Sassen) and still has problems inventing the methods to account for 
a globalised world made of flows (finance, media, commodities, migrants, and so on). However, we 
shall see that when examining this digital world, it is quite difficult for us to escape ‘methodological 
platformism’, due to the total dependency on the traces data platforms deliver!   
1.2 Opinion exists, I invented it2 
After the first generation of quantification, used by Durkheim to build the concept of society, we could 
give the label ‘2G’ to the emergence of public opinion in the late 1930s. In 1936 Gallup was able to 
predict the election of Roosevelt over Landon, based on a survey of 50,000 people. Roper and Crossley 
had done likewise at the same time. Gallup not only impressed the media and policy makers, he radically 
disqualified older methods (straw polls), including that of the Literary Digest, based on responses from 
2 million people, whilst even predicting their own erroneous results (Osborne and Rose, 1999). This 
impressive demonstration lays the foundations of the survey’s reliability and of investigative sampling 
methods. The exhaustiveness of inquiries on entire populations was indeed sacrificed in the process, but 
the new approach managed to produce accurate results, provided that the terms of representativeness 
were respected. It nevertheless failed to predict the victory of Truman in 1948, whose voters changed 
their minds in the last ten days. Methods thus applied to political life and to life-size tests as important 
                                                            
2 The works of Osborne and Rose (1999) and Blondiaux (1998) develop this story extensively. 
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as a presidential election had previously been tested on readership studies for which Gallup had 
operationalised stratified sampling. In fact, these methods had already been applied by the Norwegian 
Kiaer in 1894.  
Similar statistical methods in the field of agriculture and later in unemployment in the early 1930s, in 
the USA, underwent profound changes, from the correspondents’ method to random sampling based on 
probabilistic approaches (Desrosières, 1998, Didier, 2002). Quota methods based on ‘sensible choices’, 
where the selected sample is matched with certain properties of the population identified by the census, 
were however different from those methods of stratified random selection, and were even despised 
somewhat by statisticians  (cf. Stephan quoted by Didier, 2009). The data collected were also very 
different, since statisticians from agricultural or employment administrations wanted to obtain ‘facts’, 
but were nevertheless obliged to rely on statements, not measuring machines, even if they attempted the 
latter with the ‘crop meters’. Yet the sampling-legitimisation-operation generally succeeded, primarily 
thanks to Gallup’s (1939) performances, which were dedicated entirely to other social worlds; those of 
‘public opinion’ and not ‘society’. The latter remained a reference of statisticians of the federal state and 
its offices. It was unquestionably in the context of the mass media that the importance of sampling was 
recognised. With Ogilvy, Gallup studied film audiences, and then with Crossley, at Young’s and 
Rubicam’s consultant firms, he studied radio audiences, using telephone interviews before even making 
a proposal to conduct the election polls. From this point of view, Gallup found his counterpart in 
academiawith Lazarsfeld, who in the same period, in 1936, launched a “Radio Research Program”, based 
on audience-research-work begun in 1930. Together with Merton they launched the focus groups 
method as early as 1941, and their study of the city of Decatur in 1945 provided the data for the analysis 
of “Personal Influence” published in 1955 (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). The latter study established the 
framework for analysis of the two-step flow : mass media play a role but do nor act as a general and 
direct flow to people’s minds, despite their “broadcasting” technology but through the mediation of 
individuals who act asinfluentials . 
The links between the mass media and politics are thus elements of new statistical methods. As Alain 
Desrosières noted (1998), a national election’s predictability actually depended upon the formation of a 
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common public media-space across the United States, and only the radio could do this in such a way as 
to make the voter’s knowledge about electoral candidates comparable. Considerable media 
transformation and the mass media (radio at the time) established the conditions for the emergence and 
validation of a survey technique, which thus opens up a whole new era, most notably for political science 
and market research. Moreover, it is public opinion itself which takes on a measurable existence with 
these sampling methods whose performative power will by far exceed their experimental phase. This 
move does not disqualify the previous alignment made by censuses and mecanographic calculators that 
will soon be transformed in computers. But the role of radio (and telephone for the report of results and 
their aggregation at a faster speed) contributes to a new apparatus.   
The missing link in my description remains the vehicle of financial incentives for such investments, 
needed to understand a public. Communication agencies such as polling organisations cannot live solely 
from their campaign activities, even if they do bring them high visibility and renown. From the outset, 
their target was the mass media, as noted above, for one essential reason: audience measurement has 
been the key to the distribution of advertising space, since the dawn of radio and then later with television 
(in 1941 the first advertisements were aired on American television for Bulova watches, during a 
baseball game). But these measures also serve to monitor the impacts of these campaigns on the minds 
of consumers, giving an unprecedented boost to marketing, which in turn drives increasingly 
sophisticated communication strategies (Cochoy, 1999). Brands have thus been present, from the outset, 
in methods of inquiry into opinion using sampling; that is, from the moment such investigations were 
aimed primarily at mass-media audiences. Market research on consumer goods developed at the same 
time, from the 1930s, and in the same movement of national standardisation of products, as Desrosières 
pointed out. The production of a unified national territory, through the media, that included 
transportation and mail, established a new condition of felicity for these survey methods. This allows 
me to draw a direct parallel with the recent creation of a global market, this time beyond the national 
ones, through the domination of digital platforms. Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft 
have produced the same effect on a global territorial scale as radio and the railway had on the territory 
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of national markets. This is in line with the work of McLuhan (1964), for whom the change of scale in 
itself constitutes another kind of collective experiencefar beyond the features of the contents exchanged. 
The work done by Gallup on the business side and Lazarsfeld on the scientific side provides whole 
societies with methods with which to analyse themselves and to represent themselves – as opinions. 
Tarde (1901) has certainly paved the way for understanding the formation of publics and opinion, yet it 
is only when the metrics are established and produced in a conventional way that opinion finally exists. 
Only the media’s control and their ability to produce a unified public in a national territory enabled this 
methodological assemblage to hold. The ‘whole’ referred to by the polls is in fact originally the public 
formed by the media, which allow the audience to emerge as public opinion and to make it permanently 
visible and measurable. At this point, everyone knows that ‘opinion exists’, whatever the report about 
the artefacts needed to make it exist, and despite what Bourdieu (1984) said about it (“Public opinion 
does not exist”)). Opinion has been naturalised, ‘taken for granted’, and the sampling methods lie buried 
beneath the powerful performative effect of these immediate, aggregated indices, thse scores used by 
media for ranking preferences about politicians or products. The approximation that is measured through 
confidence intervals is made acceptable, especially with the repetition of the same questionnaire over 
time (by panel, independent rotating sample) under identical conditions, ‘all things being equal’. It 
allows for the smoothing-out of biases which then become acceptable by convention.  
1.3. The era of digital traces make a theory of replications possible   
 
The two first stages of quantification in nation-states history cannot avoid the digital 
transformation and they have been usingomputing power to amplify their own way of 
calculation. However, the collecting devices are now designed in networks and the 
traditional databases (registar, polling populations, etc.) are exceeded by the data 
deluge rising from the traces of behaviour available at a low cost on any digital 
platform. No official record, nor personally controlled expression by pollsters but traces 
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of behaviour, some of them linguistic (comments, posts, tweets, etc.)3, but most of them 
very low-level traces, such as clicks, time of exposure, likes, and so on. All of them are 
collected, produced,  analyzed, recorded, sold by digital platforms ranging from the 
GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft)  to smaller ones in cultural 
contents (Spotify, Netflix), transportation (Uber) and services of all kinds. Personal 
data and privacy are not the only issue in these environments because profiles and 
patterns are elaborated through clusters of features that may not be related at all to the 
traditional socio-demographic features that made the previous quantification eras so 
efficient for government and scientific purposes at the same time. 
While the statistical requirements for data quality (exhaustiveness and representativeness) 
can no longer be applied to dynamic universes such as social networks and the web, Big 
Data has produced ersatz that are volume and variety. However, another feature emerged, 
velocity (which thus constitutes the 3V of Big Data) which had no equivalent in the social 
sciences and in the quantification of the social. We have proposed (2017) to make 
traceability a statistical requirement as such yet to be built. It makes it possible to account 
for new entities such as replication, these contents which circulate, and which until now 
had hardly any place in society (calculated thanks to the use of the exhaustiveness of 
registers) and opinion (calculated thanks to the construction of representativeness via 
surveys). This universe is more familiar to the reader because it is the digital world of our 
                                                            
3 The fact that these expressions are linguistic make us believe they look like opinion (Boullier 
and Lohard, 2012) which a real misunderstanding about how public opinion gain visibility, 
neglecting the key role of polling institutions in frmaing these expressions and making them 
comparable and computable. This is precisely used as an argument for those who praise the 
“naturalism” and the spontaneity of these expressions on the web or on social networks to 
challenge the artefact of opinion polls. These statements ignore the framing process of 
platforms and the need for a conventional metrics to make opinion exists. What we obtain 
when scraping the expressions on the web, is a new kind of traces, that have to thought about 
as such, and this is why we propose this theory of replications that will delineate the third 
generation of social sciences.  
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daily experience. We will limit ourselves here to presenting a systematic table for the 
long-term comparison between periods.  
 1st generation  2nd generation 3rd generation 
Concept of the 
social 
Society/(ies) Opinion(s) Replication(s) 
Collection devices Censuses Surveys/Polls Platforms 
Statistical 
requirements 
Exhaustiveness Representativeness Traceability 
Co-construction 
institutions/ research 
Registers/ 
inquiries 
Audience/ Polls Traces/ 
Repurposed digital 
methods 
Major players of 
reference (and 
funding) 
States Mass media Platforms 
Operational actors National 
Institutes 
Polling organisations Web platforms 
(GAFAM) 
Founding authors Durkheim Gallup, Lazarsfeld Callon, Latour, 
Law 
Key problems of 
scientific approaches 
Division of 
labour and the 
welfare state 
Propaganda and media-
influence (audience 
measurement) 
Science and 
technology 
(scientometrics) 
Technical conditions Hollerith’s 
machine 
(tabulating 
calculation) 
Radio and telephone  Internet, Web and 
Big Data  
Technical criteria 
for data quality 
Relevance, 
accuracy, 
timeliness, 
accessibility, 
comparability, 
coherence 
Confidence intervals  
Probabilities 
Volume, Variety 
and Velocity  
The social science’s 
dominant modalities 
Explanations Descriptive and predictive 
correlations 
Predictive 
correlations, 
memetics 
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1.4. From genealogy to standpoints 
This historical inventory that we have formulated in terms of generations because 
technical and methodical eras correspond to it, appears to us to reflect indeed a diversity 
of approaches to the social that have coexisted at the very start of social sciences. The 
division of disciplines (notably between sociology, economics and psychology) as well 
as the absence of reliable empirical methods for certain approaches only make it possible 
to explain the hegemonic claim of each approach that led to this sometimes aggressive 
division of labor. Tarde, an ancestor who carried the approach of traces and propagations, 
never enjoyed academic recognition comparable to that of Durkheim or Weber. It is not 
the digital technology that makes these new entities emerge, it only makes them visible 
and calculable.They were already part of ordinary experience (like conversations and 
rumours, Boullier, 2004) and had been conceptualized by Tarde (1890) in his theory of 
imitation (which included opposition and invention) but were not traceable nor 
computable. It is therefore preferable to propose a synchronic table of these approaches.  
Generations 1st Society 2nd Opinion 3rd Replications 
Standpoints Structure Individual 
preferences 
Propagation 
Wavelengths Long term Mid-term , cycles High frequency 
Features of the 
networks 
Structure Nodes Circulating entities 
Main concern Positions Decision Propagation 
Process Inheritance Arbitrage Neighbourhood 
Status of human 
actors 
Inheritors, determined 
subjects 
Strategist, decision-
maker, rational agent 
Vehicle for 
memes’propagation 
 
Each of them works as a standpoint on the world. Each point of view depends entirely on 
the instruments it mobilizes and which frame the world and allow its capture at the same 
time (Latour, 1987). But these standpoints focus on particular entities that in each case 
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have a privileged status that we will have to characterize. They encompass 
methodological choices that cannot be used for other purposes. Admitting this limitation 
prevents from any temptation to imagine any God’s eye view that would assemble all 
viewpoints at the same time. The focus on "structures", associated with the 
exhaustiveness of censuses, clearly differs from the focus on "individual preferences" 
associated with the representativeness of surveys that are used primarily in marketing, in 
public opinion surveys but also in all major attitude surveys used by economists, for 
example on the feeling of happiness or confidence in the future, etc. These two entities 
(social structure and individual preferences4 aggregated under the so-called « market ») 
are themselves very different from circulating entities which can be messages, goods or 
beings which have their specific properties analysed sometimes in semiotics but taken 
seriously by memetics (Dawkins, 1976, Blackmore, 1999, Dennett, 2017).  
The best examples are found in propagation patterns of tweets or memes (Boullier, 2018). 
Memes are “elements of culture”  (Dennett, 2017) that spread across human minds and 
artifacts of memory, “representational states that propagate through representational 
media” as Hutchins labelled them. On the web , memes became famous by the high speed 
replications processes designed on sites such as 9gag.com or knowyourmeme.com. 
Catchphrases, slogans, stereotyped images, buzzwords and so on are the perfect 
candidates for testing the agency of these messages that are highly contagious, despite 
people’s will or taste. However, more complex items can circulate as well, including 
                                                            
4 Individual preferences are the focus of psychology and economics. « Social psychology » tries to extend the 
realm of individual preferences to social groups and collective effects (such as in network analysis). However, 
this aggregative trend is much more salient and powerful in economics that built the concept of the « market » 
to account for the coordination of all individual preferences. It looked so powerful, as is public opinion, because 
the theory of the « market » looked like an layman experience as one can do in market places. However the 
concept built a reality of its own, because its laws that classical economics designed (from Adam Smith to 
Walras), including the « invisible hand » agency, managed to make the market operational, as in a performative 
move, to the point that it is supposed to dictate all policies. This is well described by K. Polanyi in « The Great 
Transformation » who tells the story of how the economy got disembedded from society during the 19th 
century .  
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political ideas or fashion trends and the contagion process can include phases of 
derivation, where the content is slightly transformed and manage to reach a new audience 
through this transformation. Some analogy with translation processes can be found and 
sociolinguistic influences (loanwords for instance). The theory of replications that we 
want to build is based on these processes and is not limited to the restricted sense of 
memes (on the web or in the atomistic definition of Dawkins) nor to the virality process 
because derivations occur and must be accounted for. Twitter should be considered as the 
perfect replication machine, since the invention of the retweet button in 2011, because it 
creates a nudge for users to replicate the tweet without any comment, at a high frequency 
rate. We made a comparative analysis of more than 1000 data sciences papers on Twitter 
in the years 2016 and 2017 that show the prevalence of traditional distribution of agency 
to understand propagation processes: either the structure of the network (degrees) or the 
role of specific influentials are considered as the main variables to account for the spread 
and the recurrence of tweets. However, about 20% of the papers adopt a different view 
and distribute the agency, by hypothesis, to the features of the tweets. This has been well 
publicized in the case of “fake news” propagation: the large spread of fake news was 
neither correlated to the structure of the network nor to the role of influential nor to the 
intrinsic falseness of the content, but to the novelty score. This feature is an expression of 
the competition for attention among memes: the only fact of chocking some audience by 
a fresh and striking news is enough to facilitate its diffusion in a social network. This does 
not mean that the structures of the network or the preferences of some individuals acting 
as influential do not play their part. But a specific agency can be distributed to the features 
of the “fake news”.  The digital mechanism of replication is becoming so powerful for 
collective minds that we consider Twitter as the drosophila of these third generation of 
social sciences.That is to say that even though Twitter is clearly not an expression of the 
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“real life” (as much as the drosophia was clearly not a reduced model of human genetics), 
the propagation of memes within this milieu is a perfect field of experimentation for 
replication processes, provided that they are processed at the adequate formal level.  
Let us take classic examples from the sociological literature to better understand the scope 
of this “three standpoints” framework even though it is only in our digital times that it 
becomes possible to trace this processes: one example from Durkheim’s suicide, another 
one about Mauss’ gift, another one from Actor Network Theory and the final one from 
social network analysisSome will give the insights about the need for a replication theory, 
others, on the contrary, will demonstrate their reluctance to do so and their ability to act 
as if one specific standpoint can account for every feature in a given situation.  
a/ The classic opposition between Durkheim and Tarde makes sense in this context. When 
Durkheim studies suicide, he does not enter into an analysis of choice by individuals even 
though his categories may appear psychologically significant. Selfish, altruistic or anomic 
suicides all depend on the pressure that society, as a social structure, exerts on these 
individuals, to varying degrees (the degree of social integration). (revoir ici ce qu’en dit 
Boudon)The statistical methods used by Durkheim have been considered by the scientific 
community as sufficient to show these structural effects in the long term. They do not 
deal with processes of influence, beliefs or values, for example, that Weber would have 
used to explain choices and preferences for suicide (voir Boudon). These methods also 
do not capture processes of rapid, high frequency and much less "chosen" contagion as 
can be observed in some situations of suicide spread, in public, in companies or in entire 
societies as in Micronesia in the 1970s (Rubinstein, 1983). For Durkheim, "the example 
is the occasional cause that makes the impulse burst ; but it is not he who creates it and, 
if it did not exist, he would be harmless" (Durkheim, 1897:135). Tarde replies that "all 
social phenomena, all social influences, such as physical and physiological influences, 
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consist of repetition of similar acts, repetition-wave or repetition-heredity" (Tarde, 
1897:41). We understand that the confrontation is irreducible, when in fact, they each 
study different moments of the social (high frequency and "in the making", or long 
duration and "ready made") with different points of view on very specific entities that 
have their own agency. 
b/ Even more radical and unsuspected is the opposition between Durkheim and Mauss on 
the question of the entities that primitive societies make exist, and it will anticipate on the 
evolution we advocate for qualitative analysis. In his essay on the gift, Mauss (1950) 
includes Malinowski's work on the kula (1922), ritual exchanges between tribes in the 
Trobriand Islands. Malinowski saw it as a form of moral obligation to maintain peace 
between the different groups and to generate economic exchanges (market and strategies). 
Sahlins (1976), on the other hand, constructed a historical model of types of reciprocity, 
to highlight a structural effect. But Mauss, for his part, focused on the « hau », on the 
spirit of the given thing, that is to say on the attributes of the circulating entity, to which 
he confers a power of obligation because of the "spirit of the given thing" always present 
in the exchanges. Lévi-Strauss (1950) criticized this abusively indigenous vision 
according to him, even though he himself based all his theory on exchanges (of goods, 
women and signs) but on the condition that the structure of these exchanges was freed of 
any power from the attributes or entities exchanged.  
 
c/ Following Mauss’ track  about the power of objects but from a very different origin, 
Actor-Network Theory founders (Callon, Latour, Law) provoked a tremendous shock 
when they introduced the role of so-called “non-humans” in the sociological analysis. For 
instance, Callon compared the way scallops reject domestication by scientists to the one 
of fishermen against regulations (Callon, 1986).  The opposition seemed to be an 
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ontological issue against the crushing of human/nature or human/artefact distinctions. But 
the issue was in fact methodological. While ANT restored a form of agency to circulating 
entities since they could contribute to the constitution of a network or even emerge as an 
actor-network, structural approaches focused on the effects of position, hierarchy, 
reproduction, and domination that effectively record the existing asymmetry between 
humans and objects. This did not invalidate the structural and inheritance approach of 
positions and attributes, despite the tendency of ANT authors to disqualify it by showing 
the artificially constructed character of this "dispatcher" (Latour, 2005).  
d/ In this broad picture, the methods of social network analysis are supposed to bethe 
most likely to exploit the new digital resources. However theyhave in fact perpetuated the 
privileged power to act of (network) structures and individual preferences (nodes, 
influencers) (cf. Watts and Dodds, 2007). Network topology methods and their 
mathematization using graph theories reinforce the focus on structure since it is possible 
to identify clusters, densities and connections, structural holes (Burt 1992), bridges or 
gatekeepers, all properties that are related to positions in the overall network structure. 
Other approaches will focus on the role of network nodes, including dealing with 
"personal networks" and stars of varying degrees (Barnes, 1972). Nodes then refer to 
individuals whose properties can be measured through their centrality scores but whose 
influence (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955) on the behaviour of other network members can 
also be identified. This distribution of power to act, of agency, was quite well identified 
by Granovetter in his famous paper on “the Strength of Weak Ties” : "Some of the studies 
have emphsized the ways in which behaviour is shaped and constrained  by one’s network 
(Bott, Mayer, Frankenberg), others the ways in which individuals can manipulate these 
networks to achieve specific goals (Mayer, Boissevain, Kapferer)". No reference at all to 
any agency of the news, messages, ideas that circulate in these two models even though 
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Katz Lazarsfeld were careful at making distinctions in influencers’ role depending on the 
topic of the conversation.  
Pentland's social physics (2014) also mobilizes sociological analysis of networks. It 
manages to simplify social situations by adopting only two of the traditional social science 
perspectives. Two factors are identified as predictive of organizational dynamics: a/ 
"engagement" as a function of social pressure or "social learning" (extracted from 
indicators of internal connection to social groups) and b/ "exploration" as a function of 
individual initiative (such as that of a gatekeeper or bridge in social network analyses 
such as Granovetter's (1973). When it claims to study the flow of ideas, one would expect 
some consideration for the entities that circulate, an analysis of the contents of the 
exchanges, the follow-up of specific innovations and their transformations and so on. In 
fact, he tells us, "the numerical estimate of the flow of ideas corresponds to the proportion 
of users who are likely to adopt a new idea introduced into the social network. This flow 
of ideas takes into account all the elements of an influence model: the structure of the 
network, the strength of social influence and the susceptibility of individuals to new 
ideas" (2014: 83-84). In these last three agencies, no place is left for the role payed by 
ideas themselves , their design, their presentation, their capacity to capture attention 
through semiotics saliences, and so on. The networks analysis seem to proceed exactly 
the same whether people exchange jokes, scientific information, spare parts or cabbages! 
That is why we must avoid considering networks as the key word of any digital sociology, 
and rather develop a theory of replication and circulating entities where their features will 
play their role. 
What lessons can we learn from this foundging works (to which scientometry should have 
been added to be complete)? From Mauss (and his mana) to ANT (and his nonhumans), 
conceptual frameworks emerge to think of the agency (or « power to act ») of entities 
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other than social structures or individual preferences, while for Durkheim and social 
networks analysts even though the observations should trigger an investigation of the 
replications, they maintain their initial standpoint.  
The entities observed (structure, preferences or replications) constitute entry points into the 
social world which will, inevitably, remain their exit points. eThe agency distribution is also 
done in qualitative approaches. The framing of any topic, of any social issue generates a whole 
set of methods, of entities, of agencies, that are completely different depending on the adopted 
standpoint, even though, while using one specific method, the scholar is not really aware of the 
framing that they encapsulate. Let us compare some issues to see how the only fact of selecting 
a question to address will require specific methods because of the standpoint that is 
encapsulated within both the issue and the method. Studying a crisis (for example, a crowd of 
supporters in a stadium, as we did in Boullier, Chevrier, Juguet, 2012) will not mobilize the 
same methods as, for example, the social distribution of higher education students according to 
their fields of study. The entities observed are not the same, the rhythm of the processes is 
unrelated (the high frequency and short intensity versus the long duration of reproduction of 
inherited social positions). But beyond that, the questions asked and the issues are not of the 
same nature either.  The use of interviews and questionaires wouod introduce us to the 
representations and preferences of individuals that are more adapted to analyse the culture, the 
discourses, and not the structural effects. We can certainly study the long-term social 
determinants of hooliganism or the social composition of the stands at the Marseilles velodrome 
(Bromberger, 1995), and statistical analysis of cohorts of supporters would be fine for that 
(structure agency). But this will be of little use in understanding how a riot is triggered at that 
precise moment in time because one needs to collect very finely grained observations of 
behaviours on site (and not social positions nor opinions) and conversations on line, connected 
to the events on the field of the game for instance.  
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Braudel had stressed the importance of these different points of view on social time: "a clear 
awareness of this plurality of social time is indispensable to a common methodology of the 
human sciences" (1958: 726). He had thus distinguished events, cycles and long duration by 
making it clear that "the only mistake, in my opinion, would be to choose one of these histories 
to the exclusion of the others" (1958:734). What Braudel expressed is a kind of precaution 
principle that commands not to rely on one and only one standpoint to explain all kinds of social 
times. However, the methods that are used for each of these histories cannot be the same 
whether one focuses on “events, cycles or long duration”.  
Another way of expressing these different standpoints while not discarding any of them 
would be to speak of inheritance/ arbitrage and neighbourhood (« héritage/ arbitrage/ 
voisinage » in french) (Boullier, 2010) 
We would say that the structures are part of a process of inheritance, well highlighted by 
Bourdieu (1979). There is no point in contesting or flattening them: the social heritage 
has its own « laws » that have a structural effect, that acts as a "ballast" for our behaviour, 
even if  it is userful trace the mediations by which it is propagated.  Individual preferences, 
choices and decisions are moments of arbitrage that weigh possible influences, which are 
in constant conflict. But these moments of decision, which are often attributed to a 
rational, calculating or strategic agent, occur only in certain situations, without 
invalidating the effects of inheritances and neighbourhoods.. Agents' intentions, strategies 
and inner states of mind can then be part of the conceptual framework in the same way as  
economics or cognitive psychology do to account for these preferences. Replications are 
a matter of neighbourhood, of imitations by proximity, by crowd or public movements 
but always thanks to the specific power of what circulates: a passion, a desire, a belief, an 
idea, a message, a meme, the « hau », etc. It is because these entities have this power to 
act, this agency, that they provoke these emergences that cannot be reduced to the 
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inheritances of structures, even though many parameters of the situation may be affected. 
But the problems raised are then totally different because of this conceptual, 
methodological framework, which constitutes one standpoint among the three available. 
Inheritance, arbitrage and neighbourhood are therefore in no way contradictory but cannot 
be captured together because the methods for reporting on them are radically different. 
Digital technology does not change this requirement for a standpoint, but amplifies one 
of them (replications) more than the others, to the point of finally making accessible a 
specific section of society, that of replication, made of virality and memetics, of 
propagations and vibrations, thanks to the amplification of the traces, that make visible 
the agency of these circulating entities. 
tThese points of view are not limited to quantitative approaches, whereas all questions of 
scientific method face the same problems, whatever the survey techniques they use, and 
must also adopt one of the standpoints mentioned. We will see how the third point of 
view, that of replications and circulating entities, can be extracted from one STS field 
observation, that is designed for accounting for the propagation of “scientific reference” 
through a number of devices, of data formats, in order to move back and forth from “the 
world” to scientific knowledge”. Actor-network theory (ANT) is the framework used in 
the paper we discuss but the questions we want to raise would the same for any other 
qualitative field work.  However, the theoretical framework of replication would lead to 
important revisions of the ANT methods that we want to highlight here. 
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Part 2: Making the social commensurable through qualitative 
comparison: re-inventing ANT 
Bruno Latour’s “Topofil of Boa Vista” will serve us to illustrate how one of the best 
qualitative field observation can be reframed in terms of replication and what it requires 
to make comparison possible in order to deliver more controlled statements. One of the 
main requirements will be to more clearly select the standpoint from which the 
observation is made, because the delimitation of the field, the entities that come under 
scrutiny, the methods to collect and compare data will be different.  The story is told by 
an uthor who manages, as often, to create a plot from plot a research agenda involving  
pedologists (soil specialists) and botanists (specialists in equatorial vegetation). They 
have one question in common, a challenge not only scientific but political and historical 
since what is at stake in the undestanding of the forest changes: is it the forest that 
advances on the savannah or the opposite in this part of the Amazonian forest, specially 
chosen to test the two hypotheses ? This way of framing the purpose of the observation 
is a good way to captivate attention but it is also in line with what ANT emphasize in 
sciences and technology studies: “science in the making” is always embedded in 
controversies, is always debattable before a “fact” can be considered as “ready-made”. 
Fact have to be well fabricated before it becomes quasi natural. This paper is one of the 
many examples of the field works done by Bruno Latour within scientific labs, the most 
famous one being the first one that was told in a book called “laboratory life” (with Steve 
Woolgar in 1979) that paves the way for a complete shift in the way scientific activity is 
understood by social sciences. The connexion with technology and innovation in ANT’s 
works is made through the new role devoted to devices, traces, material settings, what 
was called “non-humans”. In this paper, the same focus on devices (such as the pedofil) 
will be the common thread that will populate the story with realistic notes.  Photographs 
are widely used to render this immersion feeling for the reader and to produce evidence 
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for the scientific demonstration. There are countless articles in STS and ANT that make 
an object, a device, a technical system the hero of the sociological narrative: the Berlin 
key (Latour, 1993), the electric vehicle (Callon, 1979), Aramis (Latour, 1996), the bicycle 
(Pinch and Bijker, 1984), the air pump (Shapin and Shaffer, 1985) , the stocks ticker 
(Preda, 2006), the Black-Scholes model (Mc Kenzie, 2006), etc. And this immediately 
appears to the reader: the narrative is populated with living objects or entities, such as the 
forest, that would never have had their place in observations oriented towards the agency 
of structure or individual preferences. Bruno Latour ( 1996) advocated an 
“interobjectivity” that will dissolve the usual and simplistic distribution of status to 
objects: slaves, masters or substrates of a sign. When Durkheim discussed the role of the 
flag in his work on religion, he tries carefully not to deliver any agency to the flag, except 
that of a slave of human passions or imagination. In thelist of objects like linoneum or 
perfumes that Bourdieu mentions in his “Distinction”, they convey the dispositions that 
the individual will incorporate but they are just slaves of the social positions, adding 
nothing of their own.  They remain in their place, that of slaves,. When they are lucky 
enough to be taken seriously, in the form of technical systems, such as the steam engine 
for Marx or the railways for Proudhon, they very quickly tend to become masters, in the 
form of a technical determinism, a fatal agency of the production forces, even if they are 
enshrined in production relationships for Marx or found as alternatives for Proudhon who 
politicizes these architectural choices in a vein that echoes current demands for technical 
democracy. When Barthes (1957) describes objects in short notes that have become 
famous as his « Citroën DS » or in more analytical essays such as the fashion system 
(1967), it is their value as a sign that is highlighted, which quickly slips towards the status 
of « lieu-tenant » (substitute)  of something else, of a cultural, political or even 
civilizational stake.  
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2.1. The chain of reference: devices AND statements 
The topofil of Boa Vista is neither omnipotent nor impotent; it will prove to be a decisive 
mediator, a link in the chain of propagation of the "quasi facts" not yet made during this 
experiment. It is a mediation because it translates the state of the world in another register, 
in another material format but also a significant one: a forest becomes, thanks to its 
systematically unwound thread, a laboratory that grids the ground and makes possible an 
organized, controlled collection of very heterogeneous data, coordinated between 
different disciplines. The topofil, however, acted only for its part, because no one would 
deny that researchers made decisions or that the framework inherited from scientific 
experiments on the field and their protocols was also an essential reference. Certainly, but 
without the topofil, none of these agents, supposed to be capable of acting alone, could 
have been coordinated as  a precarious laboratory in such a forest. It has not only 
transported a grid model, it has produced a new material framework and allowed 
intelligibility between researchers, it has made this small piece of the world 
commensurable. The somewhat teasing or very rigorous reader might wonder why such 
importance is given to this object when, as the article goes on to show, a quantity of other 
objects are needed to produce a scientific article. Indeed, the cupboardwhere the botanist 
keeps her plant samples is just as important. The display of the whole chain of mediations 
is a very useful summary of the whole analysis and will help the reader memorize all the 
steps and transformations required for a « fact » to emerge, a chain that can be represented 
as below (revised from a schema present in the paper).  
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The main conceptual innovation in ANT’s studies of science is this very well documented 
process that produces knowledge : any epistemologic debate comes to be empirically 
described through the methods, the equipment, the devices and so on. However, one 
should notice that this chain, even though it looks quite long and complex, is still a 
reduction proposed by the author and since there is nothing like a repository of the 
original dataset, the reader is compelled to accept or reject it without any further 
refinement. We are not aware of any validation process from the scientists that made the 
experiment, which might be an issue when ANT requires to follow the actors… but not 
to let them intrude in the social scientist’s account ! The added value of such an extended 
description is not to pretend to be complete, to account for all the entities, processes, 
material that contributed to the research : this pretention to some kind of a « whole », 
even though deployed in detail, will lead to obliterating the necessary work of reduction 
for making scientific statements comparable. . In order to obtain a more accountable and 
comparable report, the ANT style of description should 1/ accept the reductionist effect 
that any observation is doomed to produce and 2/ shift the focus within the chain of 
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activities from the agency of objects, to the one of the traces that these devices propagate 
into the chain of reference. At some moments, the paper acccounts for these 
transformations, for instance when a dataset about the soil is translated into a visual 
diagram that will be integrated into the final scientific paper.  For this purpose, the 
observation techniques may benefit from the digital traceability of all fragments of 
activity. As we will show in our revised protocol, by collecting the traces of all messages 
and data that circulate from one device to another, within the setting of the fieldwork, we 
could put the emphasis on the agency of these cognitive ressources, on their propagation 
skills until the final scientific paper. Moreover, since these traces (from one digitized 
device to another) are easily assembled in data bases and dsiplayed in timelines, we could 
improve the comparability of these flows of signals (between fieldworks or scientific 
teams for instance) and even compute these traces. The storytelling of ANT observations 
was powerful in delivering insights on objects and processes that were discarded by 
structural analysis or preferences frameworks. However the digital traceability of many 
entities can improve the precision of the accounts and make them comparable, and so 
doing  more debattable, and maybe even computable.   
 In order to show how one can move from story to traceability, Let us take the example 
of another device, that could be considered as decisive as the topofil. The pedocomparator 
that allows "at a glance" to categorize a soil sample taken from a square bounded by the 
topofil, from its color, using the Munsell code, a largely shared and conventional register 
of colours. Not by doing a big calculation or by going back to manuals, but only by 
passing the piece of soil under the holes of the pedocomparator which are surrounded by 
a color that one can "immediately" compare to that of the sample to classify it according 
to the standards of the discipline. The magic off well-designed objects requires to  
incorporate a long chain of mediations and totake into account our limited cognitive 
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capacities, to generate « affordances » (Gibson) or « prises » (Bessy and Chateauraynaud) 
enacted at a level of perception that does not require verbalization. A minimum of 
cognitive work for a maximum effect of knowledge, that Hutchins (1995) demonstrated 
about the way in which the American navy's aircraft carriers were plotted, during the fix 
cycle, thanks to elementary devices requiring no calculation but only controlled 
movements, translations and propagations. As Hutchins says, « the fix cycle is 
accomphished by the propoagation of representational states across a series of 
representational media » (p. 117). Obviously, in Latour’s paper, the description of the 
mediations is focused on the role of « representational media » and less on the 
propagation of « representational states », even though they appear as the « substance » 
transmitted by the agency of the objects.  This should make us emphasize the two-fold 
approach in the theory of replications : devices (material, representational media) AND 
representations (mental, representational states). Both are connected and their agency 
should be considered as part of the distribution of agency. The local « power to act » of 
devices must be accounted for by socigraphic approaches (and it might become a purpose 
for comparison among various social settings : does the pedocomparator always works 
that way ?).  However, the messages, the content or the representational states are the 
ones that circulate and  propagate from devices to devices and from minds to minds. The 
formatting power of these contents on the accounts is just great ( as we see from these 
scientific careful examination of pieces of messages.   
2.2. The agency of objects and the agency of circulating entities: from ANT 
to replications 
 
Admittedly, entry through objects is the most attractive, the most captivating for the 
reader who can easily understand that the topofil, the binder or the pedocomparator do 
something, transform and translate. However, what survives, what will modify the 
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conditions of action of the next link, is the information itself, namely the square thus 
drawn on the ground by the topofil with usable coordinates in a geographical reference 
frame, the color indexed from the pedocomparator according to the Munsell code which 
can then move in the form of a number, or the category of the plant thus identifiable by a 
name or a code number also. Bruno Latour insists on this double dimension of translation 
devices, hardware and software (a materiality and a statement would have said Foucault 
(1966) describing the apparatus), even though the statement is on a very small scale, an 
indicator, a label, etc. It would therefore be a contradiction to attribute all the power to 
act to the tool (the representational media for Hutchins) used when what will circulate 
and affect the conditions of action of the following ones in the chain are data, signals, 
terms or categories (the representational states in Hutchins’ terms). A consistent non-
human-centered theory based on ANT must emphasize the agency of these circulating 
entities, as did Tarde, to understand their power to act on individual brains as well as on 
structures. Therefore, the method of analysis is very important. Tracking each 
transformation and the tools that make it happen is not enough, despite the pleasure the 
reader gets from highlighting the role of previously invisible objects.  
The chain that Bruno Latour draws in his diagram is therefore the most important element, 
because through it, in this circulation, the scientific reference is fabricated, which is 
neither in the world nor in the minds but in this move back and forth, equipped with 
mediations that each do their work. The propagation of information5 is certainly not 
linear, because the links in the chain show some play in their attachment, as the diagram 
clearly shows: depending on their translation work, online loss is more or less important. 
                                                            
5 In the paper as in any scientific activity, information can appear as tables, curves, diagrams, notes, whatever is 
needed to translate one stage of exploration ot the next one that will be processed by another device. But in 
general, information that is processed in replications can range from low-level signals (including perceptual 
clues in any situation that may act as affordances) tot highly elaborated messsages (texts, images and more). 
28 
 
This is the basis of any theory of replication, which is not simple capture, recording and 
transmission of traces but slight transformations, interpretations, translations and 
treasons, these small differences that Leibniz, Tarde or Deleuze valued just as much. The 
entity that spreads does so only on the condition of transforming itself (« to exist is to 
differ » as Tarde used to say). And several translations that are too "loose" or on the 
contrary too "literal" will give different chances of spreading the initial information. 
Because of these derivations that were quite well emphasized by the founders of memetics 
(Dawkins, Blackmore) inspired by the life of genes, we speak of replications and not of 
« contagion » or « virality » in which the viruses are propagated exactly in a similar form.  
It is then possible to compare the propagation patterns of these similar entities with 
memes or even to correlate their propagations to certain qualities of the process of 
translation, chaining, mediation. Some teams working on the same subject as those of 
Boa Vista may have adopted the same tools, the same protocols and carried out a slightly 
different translation at one step or another in the process of building knowledge: a badly 
done control or on the contrary an overly detailed control, a less advanced expertise in 
drawing schemas, etc., everything can contribute to weaken their chain of conviction, the 
robustness of their statement. 
But this variation, these different results in comparable situations, the reader of the article 
does not have access to them. Here is where the ANT program could benefit from a more 
demanding control of the observations. And we shall propose a way to do it that will make 
the principle of non-hulman agency more robust, more controllable and commensurable. 
Thepurpose of Latour’s paper is to make a point in the philosophy of reference to establish 
a conceptual framework of general value and not to investigate one of the links in relation 
to the scientific methods specific to one field. However, testing the author's intuitions, 
once the fecundity of this new way of thinking about reference has been admitted, would 
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require a systematic comparison protocol, akin to the one we shall propose below. The 
power to act, the agency, either of the objects or of the memes (data, categories, etc.) that 
are propagated could then be tested within the limits of well-knowned experimental 
reproducibility. The observer focused indeed on a specific moment in the development of 
scientific knowledge, but only testing can help understand why all these links are 
important. Since it is necessary, as the author says, to be able to go back in the opposite 
direction from the statement of the final article to the piece of forest to control the quality 
of the mediations thus created. Scientists spend their time carrying out these checks but 
« everything goes as if » Bruno Latour's narrative could not account for the rest of this 
work, while sparing himself the testing for his own work since it is a philosophical 
monograph and no digital traces collection could have been set up at this time.  
Ethnography thus proceeds, by producing case studies, in cultural isolates whose 
dimensions can be reconstructed, and Latour’article fits entirely in this vein. On the other 
hand, the anthropologist's task is to collect these field studies to make them comparable, 
as Mauss did, even though he had never set foot on "real" traditional social field. As the 
very form of the "essay on the gift" shows through the stacking of empirical references in 
footnotes that sometimes eat up all the text, Mauss proved to be an excellent comparatist. 
He did so not in the name of diversity that would have to be restored, which would add 
only noise and a claim to an unreachable "whole". His aim was to extract from all the 
observations a strong point, that of "hau" in this case. Mauss was therefore making radical 
reductions of all the ethnographic material available for argumentative reasons, from a 
particular point of view, which happened to be a standpoint on the agency of circulating 
entities. The strength of Bruno Latour's essay is of the same order in terms of the 
standpoint adopted. Farar from seeking to restore the "whole" of the field work of 
pedologists and botanists, he adopts a totally new and radically reducing view centred on 
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the objects and the chain of information they circulate even though he would claim to 
repopulate the process of scientific reference, traditionally reduced to controversies about 
paradigms for instance in a kuhnina approachBut, despite the long description of the 
chain, it is still a reductionist view of the scientific work, it  si a ethnographic photograph 
of one specific team and not many, of a specific field work in the reserach program, of 
some specific tools and methods and not all of them. And there is no way escaping these 
constraints when doiing ethnography and sociography. However, the work fo the 
anthropologist of of the sociologist is to validate validate these statements, through careful 
comparison when the methods are qualitative and to calculate as much as possible this 
validation when indicators and data are set up. Unfortunately, after collecting this specific 
material from this specific field, Bruno Latour, unlike Mauss, could not rely on similar 
studies to make comparisons that would test the robustness of his hypothesis. Some 
readers might even consider this essay as an encouragement to the "thick" description, 
which must account for as many links as possible to gain credibility. B. Latour (1988) 
had already proposed such a horizon, when he wrote "Irréductions", which challenged the 
classical approaches in the social sciences. 
2.3. Time for comparisons, reductions and computation has come for ANT 
and social sciences 
ocol 
However, Latour’s own work could only be communicated at the price of constant 
reductions: in "laboratory life" (Latour and Woolgar, 1979), the photo of the laboratory 
roof does not lead him towards a thesis on laboratory architecture or fluid management 
principles, all important things in the maintenance of a "laboratory" entity, because he 
has other priorities This temptation of the "whole" which can be derivated from the 
expression "irreductions" is not supposed to be part of the ANT framework and was 
clearly challenged in our common paper on « the whole is smaller than its parts » (Latour, 
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Boullier and al. 2012), however not for the right reasons as it seems now.  Because when 
ANT’s method does not establish a protocol to make the comparison possible, it 
encourages the search for exhaustiveness or conversely the focusing on the "beautiful 
case", the beautiful « link » (the topofil for example) whereas another observer would 
have judged more « critical » the role of another device, like the pedocomparator, as we 
said before The philosophical ambition of Latour’s paper enlargesthe constant gap 
between social science traditions and the work of Bruno Latour and  of much of ANT. 
The absence of a testing protocol constitutes the greatest weakness of ANT among social 
sciences traditions, a weakness compensated by the richness and novelty of empirical 
observations, which are sufficient to change the reader's gaze (and to give him pleasure 
if the author is a good storyteller). 
It is however possible to give a scientific status to this phase of exploration that constitutes 
this open observation, which aims to « repopulate » descriptions against the a priori 
reductionism of social sciences of the structure or of individual preferences.  
It is therefore a complementary phase to this open exploration phase that should be put in 
place to validate the exploratory statements obtained by the ANT methods. Monitoring 
the actors, tracing the network of associations that are always unique by definition, cannot 
only depend on the implicit and indisputable choices of the observers, whose inspiring or 
sometimes theoretically correct approach is merely evaluated.  In a second phase, it is 
possible to enter into a systematic comparison approach, provided one has a more 
assertive point of view, centred on what makes the specificity of ANT, namely the agency 
of the entities that circulate and weave this network that become the target of 
observations. But this requirement for comparability will necessarily end up reflecting on 
the methods of collecting information because monographs, despite their tendency to be 
exhaustive, may very well not capture some critical elements required for tracking 
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« replications » that become the central object of research. We need sociographic 
monographs indeed, provided that they can be reanalyzed by sociologists in order to 
compare them. However, the monographs and their materials themselves could be guided 
in a specific way depending on the standpoint that will be used later in the comparison. 
For instance, the transformation of a precise colour coding of soil samples 
(representational states) should be monitored and would take on more importance than 
the only account of the method to collect them (the device, the representational media).  
For this monitoring, it is necessary to reach a degree of granularity that had hardly been 
possible until now, with qualitative and poorly equipped social science methods. The 
practice of science is changing thanks to digital infrastructures that fit into the entire 
reference chain. Hence, the observation of "science in the making" can also benefit from 
access to digital traces of a much finer grain. Showing the links and the role of each device 
remains essential but is still at a coarse grain if we really want to understand the translation 
process that allows information to emerge and be converted successively by the different 
links in the reference chain. For instance, the description of what the pedocomparator 
performorms is quite useful. However, the narrative does not provide the tables or codes 
that are generated by using this device, even though these representational states (tables, 
codes, figures and so on) will be necessary for the next step to design a diagram. The data 
that are vehicled require more detailed focus that the description of the representational 
media (the devices). And this attention on what circulates would be the only way to test 
whether these entities do have some agency, to the point where the devices and the human 
minds would be considered as the vehicles of the circulating representation. As Daniel 
Dennett said in a provocative way to demonstrate the radical shift of memetics : « A 
scholar is just a library’s way of making another library. » (Dennett, 1990).These 
replications must be tracked down in order to account for the different chances of survival 
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of these scientific data according to its properties (and according to the structure of the 
network or certain choices of propagators, if one adopts another standpoint). This 
evolutionary version of ANT, which would be coupled with Dennett's memetics, 
constitutes a research program that would make all these approaches more robust, thanks 
to digital traces A third generation of social sciences may find many insights in Dennett’ 
works. He proposes to focus on « elements of culture » that live their lives through human 
minds. Their randopm variation are permanent, their combinations are an intrinsic part of 
human creativity but their selection can be accounted for and now digitally traces on 
specific platforms (social networks and all GAFAM), in scientific communities (as 
scientometrics demonstrates), in popular culture propagation (memes on Internet, 
Shifman, 2014) .  
2.4. A tentative protocol for a replication-centered qualitative standpoint 
 
If we sketch up the survey protocol that could now be put in place in the case of the Boa 
Vista topofil for comparative analysis, even calculable one if possible, here is the list of 
relevant tasks:   
1/ Gather existing literature on the working methods of scientists (pedologists and 
botanists) as well as literature on their results. 
2/ Build a comparative field with very similar cases on the domain itself (forest 
advancement).  
3/ Carry out the field work for thick descriptions by restoring all the mediations as did B. 
Latour but in addition, collect the  digital traces that make it possible to trace the entities 
which circulate from one phase to the other allthrough the protocol. Make an inventory 
of the representation states that circulate (and not only of the devices, the 
representational media) that make the data emerge. 
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4/ Select certain data flows (here, « soil data » for example) and compare between the 
sites the methods of replication, i.e. both the forms of propagation but also the derivations, 
all the transformations that allow circulation. This is very similar to what Glaser and 
Strauss(1967) called « theoretical sampling », designed for generating concepts and 
theories.  
 5/ Construct a new fieldwork which deals with other topics in pedology, then between 
different disciplines by focusing on replications of a certain type which allow 
comparisons (for example: the tranfer into diagrams, both from data collected directly but 
also from interviews with producers in order to understand their own work and their role 
as vehicles of these propagations, how they are affected by variations in formats, 
transmission rates or volumes, semiotic choices made, etc.). The shift is from topics (the 
issue actors are focusing on) to replications (the elements of the data that make the topic 
survive and the individual actors act). In doing so, we follow the tracks of Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) about « continuous comparison ». « While coding an incident for  a 
category, compare it with the previous incidents in the same and different groups coded 
in the same category ». They emphasized the need for reduction of terminology and 
consequent generalizing that are required to achieve a theory : « parsimony of variables 
and formulation and 2. scope in the applicability of the theory to a wide range of 
situations, while keeping a close correspondance of theory and data »  (p.111). The ANT 
tradition tends to favor reduction of terminology through the use of very large and 
versatile concepts (translation, attachments, assemblage) that allow extensive case-
speciifc descriptions and rather loose comparisons, while we insist on the correspondance 
with data and the need for reduction of terminology in a more controllable way.   
6/ If at least some of this data can be used for computer processing, collect also the 
datasets, including images (diagrams for instance) to launch a comparative processing on 
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a larger scale, by further reducing the dimensions (example: some semiotic features of 
diagrams) without selecting them a priori.  
In the end, do we gain anything from the previous statements already present in the 
original paper on « the topotfil of Boa Vista » ? still produce an accountof « science in 
the making », by reconstituting the mediations, but also by making them comparable, 
even calculable for a part of the properties which manufacture science. Individual 
researchers are no longer at the centre, nor are data collection devices, but above all 
everything that circulates between them. Of course, neither researchers nor devices nor 
situations are evacuated or ignored, but the focus on the data and signals that pass through 
them also makes it possible toexplore how data and messages i.e. replications are acting 
and making the next steps possible. « Science in the making » is also unfolding through 
the power of circulation of these statements, and small differences can now be traced, 
studied, even calculated to account for their specific agency.  
Conclusion 
These kinds of protocols do not look as fancy and elegant as well written narratives. They 
require a long, collective and well equipped survey in order to make the comparison 
possible and the validation sound. In order to convince and to become more accountable, 
social sciences should move out of the monographic trend. Qualitative fieldwork needs 
to be more focused, at some moment in the process, around specific features, the ones 
that can be compared, which means reducing the focus and looking for thicker description 
limited to these features. However, the connection between qualitative and quantitative 
approach will be facilitated by these reductions since calculation means discretization, 
out of the analogous continuity, as we illsutrated in the case of a new protocol for the 
topofil of Boa Vista. This is where the digital capacities and especially the ones of the 
traces produced on the web and on social networks platforms make a decisive 
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contribution. All the phenomena that can be traced at a very fine grained level can now 
be accounted for, paving the way for the new generation of social sciences, focused on 
propagation of elements of culture, on memes, on ideas, on signals and so on. It appears, 
as we tried to show in the case study of the topofil of Boa Vista, that this is especially 
adapted to the ANT principles where the agency is distributed to other entities than 
structures or individual preferences. However, this extension of ANT towards a more 
analytical stance, which is the condition for its connexion with the computable accounts, 
require to quit the irreductionist view of scientific activity that triggers some nostalgia of 
a « whole », through an extensive format of description of field studies. It does not mean 
that the requirements of thick description should be discarded but that it should be 
complemented by more comparable and formalized accounts and focused on the 
replications (the ones that circulate, propagate and make other actants act) that other 
social sciences used to underestimate and even to make disappear. 
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